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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v.

:

JEROME WALLACE SMITH,

:

Case No. 890008-CA

Priority 2

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a
controlled substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), following the denial of defendant's
motion to suppress evidence seized from him at arrest and his
entry of a no contest.

(Defendant was initially charged with

unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute for value, in violation of S 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (Supp.
1988) and plead to a lesser offense.)

Defendant's plea was

conditioned upon his right to appeal the denial of the motion to
suppress and his ability to withdraw his plea should the Utah
Court of Appeals reverse the ruling of the trial court*

The

matter was heard in the Third District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, judge# presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann.
S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1987).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether the arresting officer in this case violated
defendant's constitutional rights by approaching him after
defendant had voluntarily stopped his car when the approach was
based upon observations justifying a limited investigation and
was also based upon observations of a traffic violation.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1988), in pertinent
part:
(2)(a)

It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and
intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or
order or directly from a practitioner
while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise
authorized by this subsection;
•

• •

(b) Any person convicted of violating
Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
•

• •

(ii) a substance classified in
Schedule I or II, or marihuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less
than 100 pounds, is guilty of a third
degree felony . . . .
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-69 (1988), in pertinent part:
(l)(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or
move right or left upon a roadway or change
lanes until the movement can be made with
reasonable safety and an appropriate signal
has been given.
2-

(b) A signal of intention to turn right or
left or to change lanes shall be given
continuously for at least the last three
seconds preceding the beginning of the turn
or change.
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-70 (1988):
A stop or turn signal when required shall be
given either by hand and arm or by signal
lamps.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-66 (1988):
The operator of a vehicle shall make turns as
follows:
(1) Right turns: both a right turn and an
approach for a right turn shall be made as
close as practical to the right-hand curb or
edge of the roadway. . . .
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-1(37) (1988):
"Roadway" means that portion of highway
improved, designed, or ordinarily used for
vehicular travel, exclusive of a sidewalk,
berm, or shoulder, even though any of them
are used by persons riding bicycles or other
human-powered vehicles. If a highway
includes two or more separate roadways,
roadway refers to any roadway separately but
not to all roadways collectively.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jerome Wallace Smith, was initially charged
with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute.

He filed a motion to suppress evidence of a

controlled substance seized from him and incriminating statements
made after his arrest.

The trial court denied the motion with

respect to evidence of the controlled substance seized and
granted the motion to suppress with respect to the statements
defendant made to the police officer.

Defendant subsequently

filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's ruling;
the motion was denied.

Defendant then entered a plea of no
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contest to the charge of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), a
third degree felony.

His plea was conditioned upon preservation

of his right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the motion to
suppress and his ability to withdraw his plea in the event this
Court reverses the ruling of the trial court.

Defendant was

sentenced to the statutory term of up to five years in the Utah
State Prison; the sentence was ordered to run consecutive to a
sentence he was then serving.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 20, 1988, Salt Lake City Police Officer
Bruce L Smith was on patrol at about twentieth south and State
Street in Salt Lake City (T. 11). His chief assignment was to
alleviate prostitution in the area (T. 12). Officer Smith had
seventeen years experience as a police officer, with twelve of
those years on patrol (T. 8).
Officer Smith first became alerted when he saw a person
with the upper portion of his or her body inside the passenger
side of defendant's vehicle (T. 9). The time was approximately
midnight and the situation drew his attention (T. 8, 12, 40).
Officer Smith was alerted to the situation, but neith€*r flashed
his overhead lights nor changed direction or speed as if to
approach the situation (T. 40). At that point, Officer Smith had
formed no conception that defendant was in possession of drugs;
he knew, based on experience, that drugs could be present any
time, but as to this particular instance he formed no particular
hunch (T. 16, 50).
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As Officer Smith viewed the situation, the person
leaning into defendant's car apparently looked up to see the
patrol car (T. 39), and retreated rapidly north into the parking
lot of the Alta Motel (T. 39). Additionally, while Officer Smith
focused on the scene, defendant violated Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-69
(1988) and Salt Lake City Code 12.44.130, failure to use a turn
signal (T. 8, 24-25).
Defendant was parked in the dedicated, but non-travel,
portion of the road.

He proceeded to drive north and turn into

the Alta Motel parking lot without making a right turn signal (T.
9).

Defendant pulled into a parking stall and stopped his car.

Officer Smith simply followed defendant into the parking lot; he
did not pull in behind defendant until defendant had voluntarily
stopped his car (T. 41). Officer Smith did nothing to effectuate
the stop; he could not recall whether he activated his overheads
or spotlight as he was pulling in the parking lot (T. 40-42).
After defendant had parked and Officer Smith pulled in behind,
defendant and Officer Smith both exited their cars and approached
one another (T. 43). As procedure required, Officer Smith asked
defendant for identification and his vehicle registration (T.
44).

The procedure resulted in Officer Smith's discovery that

defendant's vehicle was improperly registered (bearing his
girlfriend's plates).

Officer Smith also discovered, after

making a request for information on his hand-held radio, that
defendant was wanted for a parole violation (T. 17-19).

Officer

Smith issued defendant a citation for the traffic violation
(failure to signal and improper or expired registration) (T. 14)
and arrested defendant for the parole violation.
-5-

He had previously requested a back-up officer due to
concerns for his safety (T. 47). As a result of the registration
violation, procedure required that the vehicle be impounded for
state tax purposes (T. 20). He proceeded with the arrest- and
citation-related paper work and requested that the back-up
officer, Officer Terry Morgan, complete the inventory.

During

the inventory, Officer Morgan observed numerous clothing items
covered by a sleeping bag in the back seat of defendant's car.
She located a plastic baggie, containing considerable amounts of
cocaine and heroin, rolled up inside defendant's levis (T. 56, R.
7).
The inventory was done according to routine
requirements and was unprovoked by any preconceptions of Officer
Smith (T. 49-59).

Except for the required inventory procedure,

Officer Smith did not believe the vehicle needed to be searched.
He believed it unlikely, although possible, that drugs would be
found (T. 50).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures; Officer Smith's
actions in this case were not unreasonable and did not violate
defendant's constitutional rights.

Officer Smith observed

defendant engaged in suspicious activity and given the hour and
location of the incident, Officer Smith was alerted to the
situation.

Additionally, Officer Smith observed defendant commit

a traffic violation.

He, therefore, began to approach defendant.

Defendant, however, on hie own volition, had already pulled his
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car into a motel parking lot and stopped; thus Officer Smith did
not effect a "stop" and his initial questioning did not
constitute a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Once Officer Smith discovered defendant was wanted for a parole
violation, he had probable cause to take defendant into custody.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ARRESTING OFFICER'S ACTIONS WERE NOT
UNREASONABLE. HIS OBSERVATIONS PROVIDED A
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY HIS APPROACH
OF DEFENDANT. FURTHER, HE OBSERVED DEFENDANT
COMMIT A TRAFFIC VIOLATION FOR WHICH HE WAS
PROPEPLY CITED.
In this case, Officer Smith had both a reason to
approach defendant for limited questioning and had made an
observation of defendant in the act of committing a traffic
violation.

First, Officer Smith did not seize defendant within

the meaning of the fourth amendment.

Additionally, this case

cannot be analyzed strictly from a Terry# reasonable suspicion
approach or from a traffic stop approach—the facts support
either argument and cannot be separated.

It is important to

note, however, that because the officer had a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity may be occurring, does not
necessitate a finding that the traffic violation was a pretext
for a stop.

As Judge Hanson put it, simply because a traffic

violation occurs in a high-crime area, does not mean that an
officer must ignore it (T. 87), Further, when an officer
observes a traffic violation, he may also observe other facts
which justify a limited investigation.
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A.

Defendant did not stop his car as a result
of Officer Smith's actions; therefore, he
was not seized within the meaning of the
fourth amendment.

Officer Smith observed defendant behind the wheel of
his car while parked on State Street; an individual was leaning
inside the passenger window who then left upon seeing the patrol
car (T. 9, 39). Defendant then drove his car forward a short
distance on State Street and made a right-hand turn into the
parking lot of the Alta Motel (T. 24-25).

Officer Smith did not

do anything that caused defendant to take this action and did not
use his overhead lights at that time (T. 40). He did, however,
pull in behind defendant after defendant voluntarily stopped (T.
40-42).

Officer Smith could not remember whether he had used his

overheads or spotlight when he approached the vehicle after it
pulled into the parking space, but in any event, did nothing to
force the stop (T. 40-42).
After defendant stopped his car and Officer Smith
pulled in behind, defendant exited the car and walked toward
Smith, who had also exited his patrol car at the same time (T.
42-43).

Officer Smith greeted defendant and asked if he could

talk with him; defendant responded cordially (T. 43). Officer
Smith asked for identification and for the vehicle registration;
defendant provided a drivers license but did not have the
registration (T. 43). Officer Smith proceeded to fill out a
field interrogation card, and with the use of his hand-held
radio, asked the dispatcher to complete a warrants check (T. 44).
He thereafter was informed that defendant was wanted for a parole
violation (T. 44). Defendant, himself, informed Officer Smith
that the car was improperly registered (T. 47).
-8-

In State v. Dietmany 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987), the
Utah Supreme Court, citing United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d
223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986),
stated that there are three levels of police encounters with the
public that are constitutionally permissible:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long at
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if
the officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being
committed.
In Dietman, while investigating a burglar alarm, the
officers observed defendants in a truck pull away from the curb
across the street from the scene of the crime. An officer
followed the truck until it voluntarily stopped in front of a
residence a few blocks away.

The officer asked to speak to the

individuals and they agreed.

After getting information, the

officer left.
on the door.

Officers returned a short time later and knocked
With permission, they looked into, but did not

enter, the truck and observed property in the vehicle which had
been stolen.

The defendants contested the initial stop, saying

the officer did not have probable cause.

The Court found that

the encounter fell within the first category of the Merritt
provisions; the officer was justified in obtaining identification
from the defendants and they were not detained against their
will.

•9-

The present case is similar to Dietman.

In Dietman,

the defendants were not Mstopped" by the officer and raised no
objection when the officer asked to talk with him*

In the

present case, defendant was not stopped by Officer Smith and like
Dietman did not contest or resist the officer's questioning.
Therefore, there was no seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment at that time; only after the officer got additional
information (with respect to the parole violation warrant) was
there a seizure.
In State v. Trujillof 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987),
this Court articulated the requirements for an investigatory stop
to constitute a seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.

"A seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment

occurs only when the officer by means of physical force or show
of authority has in some way restricted the liberty of a person."
Id. at 87, citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553
(1980), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16 (1968).

This

Court provided examples of a seizure, which might include "the
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon
by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might to compelled.M
citing Mendenhall at 555.

Id.,

"In contrast, a seizure within the

meaning of the fourth amendment does not occur when a police
officer merely approaches an individual on the street and
questions him, if the person is willing to listen.
citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
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Id* at 87-88,

The present case is strikingly similar to Layton City
v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d
1277 (1987) in which a police officer observed the defendant
driving into a construction site at 1:30 a.m. and followed in
behind him.

The defendant parked and exited his vehicle without

a request to do so from the officer.

The officer exited his car

at the same time, approached the defendant, and initiated a
conversation.

This Court stated that the "initial encounter was

a consensual and voluntary discussion between the defendant and
the officer.
protection.

It was not a seizure subject to fourth amendment
Defendant's constitutional right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures was therefore not violated at
this stage."

Jd. at 967 (citations omitted).

Like Bennett, the facts in this case do not establish
that defendant was seized when he was approached by Officer
Smith.

The Officer did not act unreasonably in approaching Smith

and asking for identifying information.

Only after the Officer

discovered the parole want was defendant seized within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.
B.

Officer Smith had a reasonable suspicion,
based on objective facts, that defendant
may have been involved in criminal activity
and was not unreasonable in approaching
defendant for questioning.

Defendant claims that the officer lacked adequate
grounds to approach him, that the approach constituted a
"seizure- within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and that
the traffic violation was a pretext for the approach.

If this

Court finds that Officer Smith's actions went beyond a " level
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one" Merritt approach, his actions, nevertheless, were not
unreasonable.
The law allows the police to conduct an investigatory
stop if the stop is based upon a reasonable suspicion that a
crime is or is about to be committed.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court upheld the use of
evidence uncovered as a result of a detention short of actual
arrest and allowed a frisk incident to an on-street
investigation.

The test to be employed in determining the

validity of a stop is characterized as one of founded suspicion
or reasonable suspicion as distinct from probable cause.
Unarticulated suspicion or hunch is not sufficient to justify a
detention.

State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985).

An

investigative stop is only permissible "when the officers 'have a
reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the
individual [stopped] is involved in criminal activity.'"

Id., at

719, quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
Citing to the Terry case, this Court in State v.
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 895 (Utah App. 1987), repeated that a "police
officer, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, may approach a person for purposes of investigating
suspected criminal behavior even though there is not probable
cause to make an arrest."

The reasonable suspicion standard is

codified in Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982), which states:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand a
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
-12-

Under Utah Code Ann. S 77-77-15, an investigatory stop
is permissible when an officer has a reasonable suspicion, based
on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal
activity.

State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), quoting

State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985)); State v.
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 408-412 (Utah 1984); Trujillo, 739
P.2d at 88.
The line between a reasonable investigatory stop and an
unreasonable investigatory stop is very thin and can be
determined only on a case by case basis. To determine whether
Officer Smith had a reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant,
the totality of the circumstances confronting Officer Smith must
be examined.

An officer is entitled to assess and act on the

circumstances in light of his or her experience.

United States

v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85 (1975); State v. Mendoza,
748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); Trujillo, 739 P.2d 88-89.
Additionally, the circumstances as viewed by Officer Smith are
important because a trained police officer is able to perceive
and articulate the meaning of certain conduct that to the
untrained observer may appear innocent.
762 P.2d 2, 4 (Utah App. 1988).

State v. Baumgaertel,

Furthermore, when a police

officer sees or hears conduct which gives rise to suspicion of a
crime, according to that officer's experience, that officer has
the right to investigate and take whatever steps necessary to
enforce the law.

State v. Folkes# 565 P.2d 1125/ 1127 (Utah

1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977).

-13-

Since reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of
the circumstances, a bright line delineating what is and what is
not reasonable cannot be drawn.

State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972,

977 (Utah App. 1988), citing Brigoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 873 n.
10.

Guidance for application of the reasonable suspicion

standard can be found, however, in a review of recent cases that
applied the standard.
In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), officers
became suspicious of an automobile bearing California plates
traveling on Interstate 15 in which the occupants were of Latin
American descent.

The officers followed the car and eventually

made a traffic stop for left lane violation.
the stop to be a pretext.

This Court found

In State v. Carpena# 714 P.2d 674

(Utah 1986), officers stopped a car bearing Arizona plates that
was during slowly through a burglary-ridden neighborhood in the
early morning hours; this Court found the stop to be a pretext.
In State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), an officer who
was enroute to investigate a burglary observed two individuals
alongside the road and became suspicious because they "stared" as
the officer drove past; two hours later, the individuals were
stopped by a second officer.

This Court found that the stop

lacked reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop.
The holdings in Mendoza, Carpena and Swanigan appear to
be representative of stops based on unreasonable suspicions.

The

common thread in these cases, and other like them, is an officer
stopping an individual on the luck-of-the-draw that something
could be wrong.

In Carpena and Swanigan, the suspects did

-14-

nothing suspicious and committed no unlawful act in the presence
of the arresting officer.

In Mendoza, the suspect did nothing

unreasonable or suspicious in the officer's presence.
Officer Smith did not act merely upon a hunch that
something was amiss.

He acted on circumstances he had been

trained to recognize and upon circumstances he had a duty to
investigate.

Unlike cases in which the stop was unreasonable,

Officer Smith observed defendant clearly violate a traffic law
and engage in suspicious activity.

Under these circumstances,

his limited intrusion was not unreasonable.
Officer Smith first noticed the situation when he
observed an individual leaning halfway into defendant's car (T.
9).

Shortly thereafter, after apparently seeing the patrol car,

that same individual quickly walked in the opposite direction of
the patrol car (T. 39). To the casual observer, this behavior
may have been relatively innocuous; however, to a police officer
by virtue of training and experience, the situation denoted
possible criminal activity.
(Utah 1986).

State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088

Officer Smith had seventeen years experience on the

police force and given the location, the lateness of the hour,
and the furtive behavior, he was not unreasonable in stopping to
gather additional information.
This case does not typify the case of an unreasonable
stop.

The facts and circumstances in this case, coupled with

Officer Smith's experience, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion
that a crime had been or was about to be committed.

The

circumstances of suspicious behavior and the traffic violation
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were enough that a reasonable officer, with Officer Smith's
experience, would have taken the same action.
C. The traffic citation was not a pretext for an
unlawful stop.
At the suppression hearing, the trial court
characterized the issue in this case as whether Officer Smith
"stopped" defendant (T. 85). The court held that a stop is made
only when the stop would not have been made except for the police
officer's presence and request that the individual stop (T. 85).
The facts in this case establish that defendant pulled into a
parking spot and stopped before Officer Smith pulled in behind
(T. 87). Thus, in reality, no stop was made.
Assuming, arguendo, that a stop was made, the trial
court held that "if there's a violation of the law, whether its a
high crime area or not, it seems to me that Officer Smith was
obligated to follow up on that violation, minor as it may be
. . ." (T. 87). See State v. Folkesy 565 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1985),
cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977).

The court also stated:

"As I

read the city ordinance here with regard to turn signals, and
taking into account the location, not the location because its a
high crime area, but the location on State Street, and I believe
it occurred about midnight, I don't have the day of the week, but
we know there was at least one car immediately behind, or close
behind Mr. Smith's automobile when he pulled forward, and turned
into the driveway . . . .

[T]he law is, from a traffic standpoint

. . . that he had an obligation to signal."

(T. 86.)

A police officer may stop an automobile for a traffic
violation committed in the officer's presence.
16-

State v. Sierra,

754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), citing Braxton v. State, 234 Md.
1, 197 A.2d 841, 844 (1964); Anderson v, State, 444 P.2d 239, 241
(Okla Crim. 1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).

To

determine whether Officer Smith acted reasonably, the question is
whether the hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the
circumstances, would have stopped defendant for failure to
signal.

Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978. No bright line exists to

determine the reasonable stop; the reasonableness of the stop
depends upon the facts in a particular case.
In United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir.
1986), cited by this Court in Sierra, a patrolman observed a car
with out of state plates and the driver appeared overly cautious;
based upon this, the patrolman suspected that the car contained
drugs and followed the car for a mile and a half until he
observed a traffic violation (crossing six inches over the
painted line).

The officer testified that the reason he pulled

the car over was because he suspected drugs, not because of the
weaving.

The Eleventh Circuit found the stop to be a pretext.

In Sierra, the officer passed a car and noticed the driver "kinda
bow his head" to avoid eye contact with the officer.

The officer

checked for proper registration and found no problem, but
continued to follow the car anyway, accelerating above the speed
limit to eventually catch the car.

The officer followed the car

for a period of time, before pulling it over for a left lane
violation.

A search of the car revealed cocaine.

This Court

found that the traffic violation was a pretext for the stop.
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Smith and Sierra are different from the case at bar.
The traffic violations were relatively minor and not commonly
cited, unlike failure to signal.

Further, the officers followed

the cars for a considerable period of time, waiting for a reason
to pull them over.

In those cases, the officers would have been

uninterested in pursuing such inconsequential offenses, or taking
the effort to pursue such minor offenses, without the hope of
finding something more.
In the present case, Officer Smith testified that his
interest was drawn to a situation that possibly included
prostitution (T. 12). Officer Smith was, after all, assigned to
alleviate the prostitution in the area.

It seems unlikely that a

police officer would be assigned to alleviate prostitution in an
area where prostitution did not exist.

The mere fact that

Officer Smith observed a situation that appeared to may have been
prostitution related does not mean he automatically intended to
pull the car over.

Officer Smith's attention was drawn to the

car enabling him to observe the traffic violation.

He did not

follow the car for any period of time or at an unusual speed, as
in Smith and Sierra.

Instead, Officer Smith continued

consistently, routinely, and without gestures to pull defendant
over, until defendant pulled into the parking lot (T. 40).
The classic pretextual stop as illustrated by Smith and
Sierra, include a certain time lapse between the initial
suspicion and the stop.

In both cases, several minutes and miles

passes from the initial inarticulate hunch and the pretextual
stop.

Further, critical facts in Smith and Sierra were the
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occupant's failure to look at the officers as they passed.

In

the case at bar, Officer Smith would likely not have contacted
defendant absent the traffic violation; however, mere suspicion
of illegal activity followed by a lawful traffic stop does not
necessarily mean the stop is pretextual.

In the present case,

Officer Smith had time only to act on the objective facts and
circumstances.

The area was known as a crime area and an area of

considerable traffic.

An officer with Officer Smith's training

could objectively recognize that any thing could happen in the
area, from a traffic violation to prostitution.

Either violation

is as justifiable as the other to create a duty for Officer Smith
to investigate.

Folkes, 565 P.2d at 1127.

It was not unreasonable for Officer Smith to pursue
defendant for a traffic violation.

When a violation of the law

occurs, whether in a high crime area of not, an officer of the
law has a duty to follow up that violation.

A pretextual stop

can only be determined from the circumstances of each case.

The

circumstances in this case are different that the circumstances
in the typical pretext stop situation.

Officer Smith had very

little time to form any unreasonable suspicions, and did not keep
defendant under observation until a minor traffic violation was
committed, just so he would pull him over.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
REHEARING.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized
from him and statements made by him following his arrest.
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At the

hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant had an opportunity
to present evidence and, in fact, did so.

He was not foreclosed

from presenting any evidence and did not indicate at that time
that there was any other relevant evidence.

Defendant elected

not to testify during the hearing.
Subsequently, after defendant got an unfavorable result
and had an opportunity to ponder the situation, he filed a motion
for reconsideration to allow him to present additional evidence,
specifically his self-serving testimony.

Defendant's proffered

testimony was contradictory to what Officer Smith had stated, but
did not constitute newly discovered evidence.

The trial court

denied the motion for reconsideration.
Defendant now claims that the trial court's ruling in
this regard was erroneous and violated the interests of justice
and fairness (AB at 27).
After denial of the motion for reconsideration, instead
of going to trial, where defendant could have presented whatever
evidence in his defense that he saw fit, defendant entered a plea
of guilty.

At trial, the court would have had the opportunity to

revise his ruling on the motion to suppress if evidence were
presented to justify a change of position.

Instead, of taking

this opportunity, defendant now asks this Court to reverse his

The motion for reconsideration can be analogized to a motion
for new trial. Such a motion can be granted upon discovery of
new evidence. Utah Code Ann. S 77-38-3(7) (1982). However,
newly discovered evidence is not Hnewly remembered- evidence, or
evidence that was available but not utilized at the appropriate
time. State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 1186 (Utah 1981),
overruled in part on other grounds. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483
(1986).
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conviction because the trial court made its ruling without the
benefit of all relevant evidence.
Defendant concedes that a trial court in all cases need
not grant a motion to rehear a motion to suppress.

An appellate

court will not disturb the ruling of a trial court on preliminary
matters absent a clear abuse of discretion.

See State v.

McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 (Utah 1988); State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d
738 (Utah 1985).

Based on the circumstances in this case, the

trial court's denial of defendant's motion for reconsideration
was not an abuse of discretion and does not warrant reversal.
CONCLUSION
The defendant, Jerome Wallace Smith, was properly
convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance.

For

the foregoing reasons, as well as any reasons advanced at oral
argument, the State requests that defendant's conviction be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^{(^

day of June, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Assistant Attorney General
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